Harsh occupations, health status and social security by Pestieau, Pierre & Racionero, Maria
 
2013/1 
 
 
■ 
 
 
Harsh occupations, health status  
and social security 
 
 
 
Pierre Pestieau and Maria Racionero 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 
Voie du Roman Pays, 34 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve 
Belgium 
http://www.uclouvain.be/core 
D I S C U S S I O N  P A P E R  
 
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER   
2013/1 
 
Harsh occupations, health status and social security 
 
Pierre PESTIEAU 1 and Maria RACIONERO2  
 
January 2013 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the optimal design of a social security system when individuals differ in health status 
and occupation. Health status is private information but is imperfectly correlated with occupation: 
individuals in harsh occupations are more likely to be in poor health. We explore the desirability 
of letting the social security policy differ by occupation and compare the results with those 
obtained when disability tests are used instead. We show that tagging by occupation is preferable 
to testing when the audit technology is relatively expensive and/or the proportion of disabled 
workers differs markedly across occupations. We also study the implications of imposing 
horizontal equity among disabled workers and show that those in the harsh occupation may be 
induced to retire later. 
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1 Introduction
Social security systems are under increased fiscal pressure, in particular due to the impact of
population ageing on pension systems. Some authors have also highlighted the trend to earlier
retirement, which is particularly striking in many developed countries. As pointed in Cremer et al.
(2004), around 70% of men aged 60-64 remained in the workforce in the 1960s while nowadays in
many countries, such as Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, the percentage of men aged
60-64 still working is about 20%.
Individuals may have genuine reasons to retire early. A poor health status is an obvious one.
Indeed, according to Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999), the empirical literature has shown that poor
health plays an important role in older workers’ labor supply decisions. In this paper we explore
the role of health status in the context of an on-going public debate on whether special pension
provisions, such as early retirement, should be offered to workers in hazardous or arduous jobs.
Such provisions are historically rooted in the idea that people who work in hazardous or arduous
jobs deserve special treatment because this type of work is likely to impact negatively on the health
of workers, and may even lead to premature mortality. Zaidi and Whitehouse (2009) discusses the
incidence, structure and justification of these special pension schemes in OECD countries. They
argue that, with the exception of some narrowly defined jobs that would still qualify for a special
treatment, in general there is a weak case for either maintaining or introducing these special pension
schemes. They contend that in cases where such work-related health risks can be recognised, they
can be better dealt with some alternative, better targeted, social policies. For instance, they suggest
that those whose health is compromised due to work experiences of the past can continue to receive
a special treatment, but on individualised bases, with the help of more conventional disability
pensions policies, through work-related sickness benefits or, preferably, some combination of work
and benefits.
If it was possible to perfectly observe the individual’s health status early retirement could be
targeted to workers in poor health. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to perfectly observe the
health status. Governments often rely on disability tests before allowing a worker to retire early.
However, even ignoring possible errors, performing these disability tests is costly. Alternatively
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governments can use existing statistical information about the relationship between health status
and occupation and provide special benefits to workers in occupations that are considered harsh,
on the basis that working in these occupations leads on average to poorer health status (i.e. the
special pension provisions mentioned above). Granting early retirement to an array of hazardous
occupations is however not without cost, particularly in a dynamic setting as it may be politically
delicate to abandon special treatments when formerly harsh occupations turn to be less demanding.1
Special pension provisions can also be considered inequitable, particularly when there are workers
in poor and good health in both occupations: two workers with the same underlying health status
are likely to be treated differently just because they have different occupations.
In this paper we explore in some detail the choice between special pension provisions and
disability tests. To analyze this issue we adopt a simple setting with two occupations and two levels
of health status. All individuals have the same productivity but those in the harsh occupation face a
higher probability of being in poor health than those who have a safe occupation. The health status
is private information but the occupation is observable and can be used as a tag (i.e. the social
security system is allowed to differ by occupation). We characterize the optimal social security
policy by occupation and compare the results with those obtained using disability tests instead.
We perform numerical simulations to identify the circumstances under which tagging outperforms
testing: when the audit technology is particularly expensive and/or the distributions of healthy and
unhealthy individuals in the two occupations differ markedly. We also explore the implications of
imposing horizontal equity among disabled workers to ensure that the disabled workers in the safe
occupation are not made worse-off by tagging than the disabled workers in the harsh occupation.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and obtain the laissez-
faire solution. In section 3 we derive the first-best benchmark solution. In section 4 we analyze the
second-best asymmetric information problem without tagging (i.e. when the policy does not differ
by occupation), without and with disability tests. We also explore the second-best asymmetric
1Debrand and Lengagne (2008) point out that primary sector jobs - which are often associated with heavy physical
workloads - are becoming rarer. Despite this, physical risks at work, as well as psychological problems, are increasing.
Stressful work appears to be responsible for a growing number of work-related health problems. They argue that this
may be linked to new forms of work organization and study the links between quality of employment and the health
of older workers, using the Share 2004 survey. Their results suggest that lack of support at work and feeling of job
insecurity are two key factors afecting the health status of older workers.
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information problem with tagging (i.e. when the social security policy is allowed to differ by
occupation). We perform numerical simulations in section 5 to shed more light on the results. We
conclude in section 6.
2 The model
We consider a society in which individuals differ in health status and occupation. The health
status, represented by hi, is private information.
2 We assume that individuals can be either in
good or in poor health: hH > hD, where H and D stand for healthy and disabled, respectively.
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The occupation, represented by subscript j = 1, 2, is observable. nj stands for the proportion of
workers in occupation j and pj for the proportion of workers in occupation j that are disabled. We
assume that p1 > p2. Accordingly, we refer to occupation 1 as harsh and occupation 2 as safe. We
assume that both occupations yield the same wage w.4
We have hence four types of individuals ij with preferences represented by the following utility
function:5
Uij = u (cij)− v (zij;hi) (1)
where c represents lifetime consumption and z represents the retirement age. The utility of con-
sumption function u (.) is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave (i.e. u′ (.) > 0 and
2We assume that the individual learns her health status in the first years of employment.
3 In the following we denote the individuals in good and poor health as healthy and disabled, respectively, for
convenience.
4By assuming equal wages we do not focus on the standard redistribution one expects from healthy well-paid
individuals to disabled poor ones. Note also that we do not endogeneize in this paper the choice of occupation. We
take it as given, which is consistent with e.g. assuming a segmented labour market. Endogenous occupational choice
and differential wages will be considered in further research.
5This reduced-form utility function can be derived from an individual intertemporal problem as in Cremer et
al. (2004, 2007). Consider an individual with wage w and health status h dividing his lifetime with duration
normalized to one into a period of full activity and a period of retirement. Assume that utility is additively separable
between consumption and effort, that there are no liquidity constraints and that both the interest rate and the
time discount rate are zero. Lifetime utility can be written as U =
∫
1
0
u (c (t)) dt −
∫ z
0
v (t;h) dt where c (t) is
instantaneous consumption, u (.) is a strictly increasing and concave instantaneous utility function, z (z ≤ 1) is
the age of retirement and v (t) denotes an increasing function effort disutility, which is assumed to depend on
the health status of the individual. The budget constraint in the absence of a social security policy is given by∫
1
0
c (t) dt =
∫ z
0
wdt. Separability, concavity of the instantaneous utility functions, perfect capital markets and certain
lifetimes imply that consumption is perfectly smoothed. If c represents lifetime consumption (also instantaneous
consumption since lifetime duration is normalized to one) the lifetime utility can be rewritten as U = u (c)− v (z; h)
where v (z; h) =
∫ z
0
v (t;h) dt represents the disutility of prolonging activity, which is an increasing and convex function
of retirement age z and depends on the health status of the individual We use this reduced form for utility throughout
the paper.
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u′′ (.) < 0). The disutility of prolonging activity function v (.) is assumed to be increasing and
convex (i.e. v′ (.) > 0 and v′′ (.) > 0). We also assume that the disutility of prolonging activity
depends on the health status of individuals hi and, in particular, that the marginal disutility of
working longer is higher for disable individuals: v′(z;hD) > v
′(z;hH) for all z.
6 The marginal rate
of substitution is given by
MRSijzc =
v′(zij ;hi)
u′ (cij)
. (2)
At a given allocation in the (z, c)−space the indifference curve of the disabled individuals are
steeper.
The disability/retirement social security policy is a combination of consumption and retirement
age (cij, zij). This social security policy can be implemented by a payroll tax, τ, and pension benefits
that depend on retirement age, b (zij), and can be represented by a non-linear tax function:
T (zij) = τwzij − (1− zij) b (zij) . (3)
Differentiating T (zij)with respect to zij yields the marginal tax on prolonging work (i.e. postponing
retirement):
T ′ (zij) = τw + b (zij)− (1− zij) b
′ (zij) . (4)
This expression shows a trade-off between the cost of delaying retirement, given by the extra
contributions τw and the foregone pension b (zij), and the increase in benefits b
′ (zij) during the
period of retirement zij .
The consumer ij’s problem under a non-linear function T (zij) can be written as
max
zij
u [wzij − T (zij)]− v (zij ;hi) .
The first-order condition (hereafter FOC) yields
T ′ (zij) = w −
v′(zij;hi)
u′ (cij)
. (5)
A non-zero marginal tax implies a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between work
and consumption and the marginal productivity of labour. When the marginal tax is non-zero
6Note that the utility for consumption is independent of health status.
5
the pension system is hence not actuarially neutral at the margin, following the terminology from
Cremer et al. (2007).7
In a market economy, each individual chooses cij and zij to maximize (1) subject to the budget
constraint cij = wzij . The FOC for each individual ij, with i = D,H; j = 1, 2, is u
′(cij)w =
v′(zij ;h) with cij = wzij. Accordingly, in the laissez-faire the indifference curves of individuals
with health status hi are tangent to w in the (z, c)−space:
MRSijzc =
v′(zij ;hi)
u′ (cij)
= w. (6)
Since v′(z;hD) > v
′(z;hH) individuals with different health status achieve different combinations
of lifetime consumption and retirement age. In particular, disabled individuals work and consume
less than healthy ones.
3 The first best
If the social planner was able to observe the health status of individuals it would maximize the
social objective subject only to the resource constraint. With a utilitarian social objective the
first-best problem can be represented by the following Lagrangian:
L =
∑
j=1,2
nj [(1− pj) (u(cHj)− v(zHj ;hH)) + pj (u(cDj)− v(zDj;hD))] +
+µ
∑
j=1,2
nj [w ((1− pj) zHj + pjzDi)− ((1− pj) cHj + pjcDj)]
where µ is the Langrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint.
The FOCs with respect to cij and zij are u
′ (cij) = µ and v
′ (zij;hi) = µw,∀i, j, respectively.
Lifetime consumption is the same for all individuals regardless of occupation or health status:
cH = cD = c. The retirement age does not depend on occupation but depends on health status
with zD < zH : disabled individuals retire earlier. To decentralize the full information solution
lump-sum transfers from healthy to disabled individuals are sufficient and it is not necessary to
distort the retirement choice of any individual since, rearranging the FOCs:
v′(zij;hi)
u′ (cij)
= w, (7)
7Cremer et al. (2007) use the term "actuarial neutrality" regarding retirement to draw a distinction from marginal
or average fairness regarding the relation between contribution and benefit.
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which implies T ′ (zij) = 0 for all ij (i.e. the pension system is actuarially neutral at the margin).
If health status is otherwise not observable the first-best solution described above is not feasible.
This is so because healthy individuals would be better off by retiring at the lower retirement age
designed for disabled ones:
u(cD)− v(zD;hH) > u(cH)− v(zH ;hH) since zD < zH .
4 The second best
When health status is not observable the social planner has to take into consideration the incentives
provided by the policy to induce individuals to reveal their true health status. In this section we
compare alternative second-best policies. We present first the second-best benchmark solution
in which the social security policy is not allowed to differ by occupation. We then explore the
alternative approaches of using disability tests or allowing the social security policy to differ by
occupation instead.
4.1 Same social security policy across occupations
When health status is private information, the social planner needs to ensure that healthy individ-
uals do not have incentives to mimic disabled ones. The second best problem is represented by the
following Lagrangian:
£ =
∑
j=1,2
nj [(1− pj) (u(cH)− v(zH ;hH)) + pj (u(cD)− v(zD;hD))]
+µ
∑
j=1,2
nj [w ((1− pj) zH + pjzD)− ((1− pj) cH + pjcD)]
+λ [u(cH)− v(zH ;hH)− u(cD) + v(zD;hH)]
where λ represents the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the self-selection constraint that is
incorporated to ensure that healthy individuals do not have incentives to mimic disabled ones.
Rearranging the FOCs from the above problem we obtain:
u′ (cH) =
µ
1 + λ
n1(1−p1)+n2(1−p2)
, (8)
v′(zH ;hH)
u′ (cH)
= w, (9)
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for the healthy workers, and
u′ (cD) =
µ
1− λ
n1p1+n2p2
, (10)
v′(zD;hD)
u′ (cD)
= w −
λ
n1p1 + n2p2
[
w −
v′(zD;hH)
u′ (cD)
]
< w, (11)
for the disabled workers. Hence, cH > cD, T
′ (zH) = 0 and T
′ (zD) > 0. The pension policy is
actuarially neutral for healthy workers. Disabled individuals obtain a lower lifetime consumption
than healthy ones and their decision to retire is distorted at the margin, towards earlier retire-
ment. The downward distortion in zD is justified by incentive arguments. Healthy individuals
have flatter indifference curves at any given point in the (z, c)−space than disabled ones because
the marginal disutility of prolonging activity is smaller. By inducing disabled individuals to retire
earlier it is possible to relax an otherwise binding self-selection constraint and extend the amount
of redistribution that takes place from healthy to disabled individuals.
4.2 Disability tests
The implicit tax on prolonging activity imposed on disabled individuals in the second best problem
above stems from the asymmetry of information regarding the health status. A way to address
up to some extent the lack of information on health status is to introduce audits. If bad health is
considered a form of disability, disability tests can be conducted to prevent healthy workers from
claiming undeserved benefits. Cremer et al. (2007) explores the use of disability tests designed
to discourage healthy individuals from claiming to be disabled. They incorporate a particular
type of audit that is costly but error-proof. Any individual claiming to be disabled is audited
with probability pi. This audit is perfect and has a total cost k (nDpi) , where nD stands for the
proportion of disabled individuals in the society (n1p1 + n2p2 in our case). If it is found that the
individual is healthy rather than disabled, the individual is allocated a minimum utility u.
Audits affect both the resource constraint and the self-selection constraint:
∑
j=1,2
nj [w ((1− pj) zH + pjzD)− ((1− pj) cH + pjcD)]− k ((n1p1 + n2p2)pi) ≥ 0, (12)
u(cH)− v(zH ;hH) > (1− pi) [u(cD)− v(zD;hH)] + piu. (13)
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Increasing the audit probability is costly but it enables to relax the incentive constraint by
reducing the level of utility achievable by the mimicker. In the optimal solution a compromise is
found between these two considerations. It is worth noting that if the audit was costless the central
planner would use an audit probability that would make the self-selection constraint non binding
and the first-best solution would be achieved without any distortion. When the cost of audit k
increases, the audit has to be restricted to a decreasing number of individuals who claim to be
disabled. The distortion on the choice of the retirement age increases with the cost of the audit. If
the audit was too costly we would then approach the second-best problem studied above.
The second-best problem with disability tests is represented in our case by the following La-
grangian:
£ =
∑
j=1,2
nj [(1− pj) (u(cH)− v(zH ;hH)) + pj (u(cD)− v(zD;hD))] +
+µ
∑
j=1,2
nj [w ((1− pj) zH + pjzD)− ((1− pj) cH + pjcD)]− k ((n1p1 + n2p2)pi) +
+λ [u(cH)− v(zH ;hH)− (1− pi) [u(cD)− v(zD;hH)]− piu]
Rearranging the FOCs from the above problem we obtain:
u′ (cH) =
µ
1 + λ
n1(1−p1)+n2(1−p2)
, (14)
v′(zH ;hH)
u′ (cH)
= w, (15)
for the healthy workers, and
u′ (cD) =
µ
1− λ
n1p1+n2p2
(1− pi)
, (16)
v′(zD;hD)
u′ (cD)
= w −
λ
n1p1 + n2p2
(1− pi)
[
w−
v′(zD;hH)
u′ (cD)
]
, (17)
for the disabled workers. A higher pi involves a smaller distortion at the margin on zD.
To determine the optimal level of pi we have to use the first-order condition with respect to pi,
which can be rewritten:
λ [u(cD)− v(zD;hH)− u] ≤ µ [n1p1 + n2p2] k
′ ((n1p1 + n2p2)pi) . (18)
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The determination of pi depends on the trade-off between the costs of increasing the audit probabil-
ity, given by µ [n1p1 + n2p2] k
′ ((n1p1 + n2p2)pi), and the benefits derived from a relaxed incentive
compatibility constraint. The latter depend on the utility gap between not being and being caught
lying. The optimal pi depends on the audit costs: higher costs involve lower pi, and viceversa.
Note, however, that auditing with probability 1 is never optimal, which is a standard result in
auditing models. If pi = 1, the self-selection constraint is satisfied with strict inequality and λ = 0,
which would imply that the derivative is negative. If incentive constraints are satisfied with strict
inequality, they continue to be satisfied when the audit probability is slightly reduced.
4.3 Tagging by occupation
We have just seen that the self-selection constraint that links healthy and disabled individuals can
be relaxed at the expense of introducing costly audits. We explore now an alternative second-best
solution that seeks to exploit the differences in distributions of healthy and disabled workers by
occupation.8 In particular we investigate whether, and if so how, the social security policy should
differ by occupation. The main distinction with respect to the second-best benchmark in which the
social planner employs a single social security policy regardless of occupation is that now there is
one self-selection constraint for each occupation:
£ =
∑
j=1,2
nj [(1− pj) (u(cHj)− v(zHj;hH)) + pj (u(cDj)− v(zDj ;hD))] +
+µ
∑
j=1,2
nj [w ((1− pj) zHj + pjzDi)− ((1− pj) cHj + pjcDj)] +
+λ1 [u(cH1)− v(zH1;hH)− u(cD1) + v(zD1;hH)] +
+λ2 [u(cH2)− v(zH2;hH)− u(cD2) + v(zD2;hH)]
where λj is the Lagrange multiplier associated the self-selection constraint that ensures that healthy
individuals do not have incentives to mimic disabled ones in occupation j.
8We assume that the government uses existing statistical information about the relationship between health status
and occupation, and that this information does not rely on disability tests being performed. Many households surveys
contain information about occupation and health status. This is for instance the case of the Survey on Health Ageing
and Retirement in Europe (Börsch-Supan et al., 2005), commonly known as Share. It would be worth considering in
further research the possibility and implications of employing the outcomes from disability tests, if they are performed,
to update the statistical relationship between health status and ocupation that is used for tagging purposes. We thank
Kieron Meagher and Rohan Pitchford for this suggestion.
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Rearranging the FOCs we obtain, for healthy workers in occupation j:
u′ (cHj) =
µ
1 +
λj
nj (1− pj)
, (19)
v′(zHj ;hH) =
µw
1 +
λj
nj (1− pj)
. (20)
There is hence no distortion at the margin for healthy individuals: T ′ (zHj) = 0 in all occupations
j. However, this does not mean that healthy individuals in different occupations receive the same
social security policy treatment, given by the combination of lifetime consumption and retirement
age, nor achieve the same utility level. If there is a larger proportion of individuals in poor health
in occupation 1 (hence, a smaller proportion of healthy individuals in the harsh occupation) there
is a tendency to increase benefits and decrease retirement age for healthy individuals in the harsh
occupation. Healthy workers in the harsh occupation would in those cases benefit from being mixed
with a large proportion of disabled ones. The precise relationship between the social policy that
applies to healthy individuals in different occupations depends on the value of the Lagrange mul-
tipliers for which we do not have closed-form solutions with the general functional forms assumed.
However, in the cases where cH1 > cH2 then zH1 < zH2 and UH1 > UH2.
For disabled workers in occupation j we obtain:
u′ (cDj) =
µ
1−
λj
njpj
, (21)
v′(zDj ;hD)
u′ (cDj)
= w −
λj
njpj
(
w −
v′(zDj;hH)
u′ (cDj)
)
< w. (22)
Disabled workers consume less than healthy workers with the same occupation - i.e. cDj < cHj -
and are distorted at the margin - i.e. T ′ (zDj) > 0 - in both occupations j. The extent to which
the consumption of healthy and disabled workers differ, as well as the extent to which retirement
of disabled workers is distorted at the margin, may however vary by occupation.
4.3.1 3-types societies
In order to shed more light on the results we concentrate next on 3-types societies, of the kind
Akerlof (1978) first analyzed, in which one of the groups contains individuals of a single type.
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Given that p1 > p2 there are only two possible 3-types societies to consider: either p2 = 0 (i.e.
all workers in the safe occupation are healthy - in this case there are both healthy and disabled
workers in the harsh occupation) or p1 = 1 (i.e. all workers in the harsh occupation are disabled -
in this case there are both healthy and disabled workers in the safe occupation).
If all workers in the safe occupation are healthy the only relevant self-selection is the one linking
healthy and disabled workers in the harsh occupation. We obtain:
u′ (cD1) =
µ
1− λ1
n1p1
, (23)
u′ (cH1) =
µ
1 + λ1
n1(1−p1)
, (24)
u′ (cH2) = µ, (25)
which implies cD1 < cH2 < cH1. As before we obtain non-distortion on healthy workers in both
occupations T ′ (zH2) = T
′ (zH1) = 0 and T
′ (zD1) > 0. Also cH1 > cH2 and zH1 < zH2 imply that
UH1 > UH2.
If all workers in the harsh occupation are disabled the only relevant self-selection is the one
linking healthy and disabled workers in the safe occupation. We obtain:
u′ (cD1) = µ, (26)
u′ (cD2) =
µ
1− λ2
n2p2
, (27)
u′ (cH2) =
µ
1 + λ2
n2(1−p2)
, (28)
which implies cD2 < cD1 < cH2. No distortion is imposed on healthy workers in the safe occupation,
T ′ (zH2) = 0, or on workers in the harsh occupation, who are all disabled, T
′ (zD1) = 0. On the
other hand disabled individuals in the safe occupation are distorted at the margin T ′ (zD2) > 0.
cD1 > cD2 and zD1 < zD2 imply that UD1 > UD2. The workers in the harsh occupation, who can be
readily identified as disabled, are made better off than the disabled workers in the safe occupation,
who are mixed with healthier workers.
4.3.2 Horizontal equity among disabled workers
If the distribution of health status by occupation differs conditioning the social security policy
on occupation increases social welfare. This result from tagging literature is well known since
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the seminal paper by Akerlof (1978). However, Akerlof (1978) also noted that for certain social
objectives tagging might violate the principle of horizontal equity. In our case, individuals with the
same health status may achieve different utility levels because they belong to different occupations.
We have just showed this is the case in the 3-types societies above. Other such examples may arise
more generally when there are both healthy and disabled workers in both occupations but the ratio
of disabled to healthy workers differs by occupation. This horizontal inequity result is one of the
aspects of tagging that has received more criticism. We address this criticism below, up to some
extent, by ensuring that the worse-off workers in the safe occupation are not made worse off by
tagging than the worse-off workers in the harsh occupation.9
£ =
∑
nj
j=1,2
[(1− pj) (u(cHj)− v(zHj ;hH)) + pj (u(cDj)− v(zDj;hD))] +
+µ
∑
nj
j=1,2
[w ((1− pj) zHj + pjzDi)− ((1− pj) cHj + pjcDj)] +
+λ1 [u(cH1)− v(zH1;hH)− u(cD1) + v(zD1;hH)] +
+λ2 [u(cH2)− v(zH2;hH)− u(cD2) + v(zD2;hH)] +
+γ [u(cD2)− v(zD2;hD)− u(cD1) + v(zD1;hD)] ,
where γ represents the Lagrange multiplier associated the additional constraint that ensures that
disabled workers in the safe occupation are not made worse than disabled workers in the harsh
occupation.
For healthy workers in occupation j we obtain, as before:
u′ (cHj) =
µ
1 +
λj
nj (1− pj)
and v′(zHj ;hH) =
µw
1 +
λj
nj (1− pj)
(29)
with T ′(zHj) = 0. For disabled workers in occupation 1 we obtain:
u′ (cD1) =
µ
1− λ1+γ
n1p1
and v′(zD1;hD) =
n1p1µw + λ1v
′(zD1;hH)
n1p1 − γ
, (30)
9This is the simplest way of addressing the horizontal inequity that results at the bottom without fundamentally
altering the social objective. By keeping the same social objective we are able to quantify in the numerical simulations
the welfare loss that results from imposing horizontal equity among disabled. It is possible to show that the maximin
objective also ensures horizontal equity among disabled individuals. Numerical solutions for the maximin objective
are available from the authors upon request. When compared with the results in Table 4, distortions imposed on
disabled individuals are larger, particularly for those in the safe occupation, all individuals consume less, healthy
workers retire later (difference is more pronounced for those in the safe occupation) and are worse off, while disabled
workers retire earlier (more so those in the safe occupation) and are better off.
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whereas for disabled workers in occupation 2:
u′ (cD2) =
µ
1− λ2−γ
n2p2
and v′(zD2;hD) =
n2p2µw + λ2v
′(zD2;hH)
n2p2 − γ
, (31)
with both disabled types being distorted at the margin, T ′(zDj) > 0, albeit to different extents. It
can be shown that all constraints bind. In particular, γ > 0 and UD2 = UD1. This does not mean
however that the disabled individuals in both occupations receive the same combination of lifetime
consumption and retirement age. There may be cases in which the disabled workers in the safe
occupation are allowed to retire earlier than disabled workers in the harsh occupation, but those
working longer in the harsh occupation are compensated with extra consumption so as to achieve
the same utility level as disabled workers in the safe occupation, who retire earlier.
Imposing horizontal equity at the bottom will however affect the level of social welfare that can
be achieved, resulting in lower overall social welfare than that achieved when the utility levels of
disabled individuals in different occupations are allowed to differ.
To better assess how the results differ for the different cases mentioned we perform some nu-
merical simulations below. We show that the ratio of disabled to healthy workers by occupation
plays a prominent role. We also quantify the welfare loss when horizontal equity among disabled
is imposed.
5 Numerical illustration
The functional form we employ for the numerical simulation is:
Uij = u (cij)− v (zij ;hi) = ln cij −
1
hi
zij

. (32)
We use w = 100 and ε = 2, as well as hH = 2/3 and hD = 0.2.
10 We assume n1 = n2 = 1/2 (i.e.,
the proportion of individuals working in each of the two occupations is the same) and focus on the
role of varying the proportions pi. We start from the benchmark case where p1 = p2 = 1/2 and
10These values are consistent with those employed for the disutility of prolonging activity in Cremer et al. (2007),
which previously explored the role of disability tests. The setting is however slightly different. The purpose of their
numerical illustration was to analyze the use of disability tests to separate leisure-prone from genuinely disabled
individuals who display the same disutility of effort parameter. The aim of our illustration is however to compare the
use of disability tests and tagging by occupation. Accordingly, the ratios of disabled to healthy workers in different
occupations play a crucial role in our simulations. We vary these ratios to assess the role that alternative distributions
play, whereas the proportions of individuals of different types was kept constant in their illustration.
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Second best
Types D H
c 46.7991 75.9984
z 0.350761 0.877211
T ′ 0.179235 0
U 3.53828 3.75359
SW 3.64593
Table 1: Second-best benchmark: same social security policy across occupations
k (pi) 2000pi2 1000pi2 100pi2
pi 0.0129489 0.0244932 0.113179
Types D H D H D H
c 47.960 75.191 49.027 74.4757 58.395 69.102
z 0.348 0.887 0.346 0.895 0.323 0.965
T ′ 0.165 0 0.152 0 0.0569 0
U 3.567 3.730 3.593 3.710 3.80638 3.5375
SW 3.64882 3.65140 3.67194
Table 2: Second best with disability tests
explore the subsequently relevant cases where p1 > p2, when occupation 1 is effectively harsher
than occupation 2, keeping the overall proportion of disabled individuals in the society however
constant, so that the role of the different ratios of disabled to healthy workers by occupation is
isolated from the role of the overall number of disabled individuals in the society.
We include in Table 1 the results for the second-best benchmark without tagging (i.e. when the
planner is not allowed to differentiate the social security policy by occupation).11
We include in Table 2 the results for the second best with disability tests. As Cremer et
al. (2007) we consider different audit technologies, from more expensive to cheaper ones. Not
surprisingly the probability of audit, and the level of social welfare achieved, is larger for cheaper
audit technologies. With cheaper audit technologies healthy individuals consume less and retire
later than with more expensive technologies. Cheaper technologies allow the government to provide
a higher utility level for disabled individuals, with a combination of higher lifetime consumption
11 In the tables T ′ stands for the marginal tax rate on earnings from prolonging activity to enable relatively
straightforward comparison, in terms of magnitude, with traditional optimal income taxes.
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(p1, p2) (0.6, 0.4) (0.7, 0.3)
Types D1 H1 D2 H2 D1 H1 D2 H2
c 50.180 78.679 43.650 73.532 53.783 81.573 40.743 71.281
z 0.344 0.847 0.356 0.907 0.335 0.817 0.359 0.935
T ′ 0.137 0 0.223 0 0.098 0 0.269 0
U 3.620 3.827 3.460 3.681 3.704 3.900 3.385 3.611
SW 3.64766 3.65281
(p1, p2) (0.8, 0.2) (0.9, 0.1)
Types D1 H1 D2 H2 D1 H1 D2 H2
c 57.600 84.675 38.085 69.248 61.620 87.981 35.685 67.430
z 0.3258 0.787 0.360 0.961 0.315 0.758 0.359 0.989
T ′ 0.062 0 0.314 0 0.029 0 0.359 0
U 3.788 3.974 3.316 3.543 3.873 4.047 3.252 3.478
SW 3.66124 3.67275
Table 3: Tagging
and earlier retirement, with lower distortions at the margin, relative to allocations achieved when
the technology is more expensive.
We include in Table 3 the second best results when tagging by occupation is possible. Note that
the results in Table 2 above, with policies that do not take into account differences in distributions of
healthy and disabled across occupations, hold for different distributions of the healthy and disabled
individuals by occupation as long as the overall proportion of healthy and disabled individuals in
the population remains the same.
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from the previous tables. When compared with
the second best in which the planner employs the same social security policy across occupations,
tagging by occupation increases overall social welfare. The gains in social welfare of allowing the
social planner to tag are more pronounced when the distribution of disabled versus healthy workers
differs significantly by occupation. The comparison with disability testing is ambiguous in general
but some relatively intuitive observations can be highlighted: if the audit technology available is
relatively cheap (k (pi) = 100pi2) and the difference in distributions across occupations is small
(p1 = 0.6 and p2 = 0.4) disability testing implies a higher overall social welfare. As the distribution
of disabled workers across the two occupations becomes more unequal and/or the audit technology
becomes more expensive tagging by occupation becomes preferable.
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The increases in overall social welfare when the social planner employs different social security
policies by occupation are however obtained at the expense of significant horizontal inequity among
individuals with the same health status but different occupation. In the simulation results in Table
3 healthy and disabled workers in the harsh occupation obtain a higher level of consumption and
retire earlier than their counterparts in the safe occupation. That is, ci1 > ci2, zi1 < zi2 with
Ui1 > Ui2 for both i = H,D, with the utility achieved by both healthy and disabled workers in
the harsh occupation being higher than the utility they would achieve if tagging was not possible.
The healthy workers in the harsh occupation benefit from being mixed with a large proportion
of disabled workers, whereas the healthy workers in the safe occupation are harmed. This effect
is stronger when the proportion of disabled workers is relatively small in the safe occupation and
relatively large in the harsh occupation. It is worth noticing that when the proportion of disabled
workers in the harsh occupation approaches 1 the marginal tax imposed on the disabled worker in
the harsh occupation tends to 0. This is consistent with the analytical result presented above of
non-distortion on disabled workers in the harsh occupation when all workers in the harsh occupation
are disabled.
We present in Table 4 a numerical illustration for the second best with tagging when the social
planner is constrained by ensuring that horizontal equity holds among disabled workers.
The horizontal equity among disabled workers is achieved at the expense of some aggregate loss
in social welfare. This loss in overall social welfare tilts in some cases the balance making disability
tests now preferable in situations where tagging by occupation was preferred before. For instance,
for p1 = 0.8 and p2 = 0.2 tagging by occupation was preferred to a disability test with audit cost
k (pi) = 1000pi2, before the introduction of the horizontal equity constraint among disabled workers,
but the disability test is preferred now. It is however still the case that tagging remains preferred
to a test with such an audit technology if the distribution of disabled workers across occupations
is more unequal (e.g. p1 = 0.9 and p2 = 0.1). Note that with the disability tests disabled workers
receive the same treatment regardless of their occupation, and the same holds for healthy workers.
When tagging is allowed, horizontal equity at the bottom, with both disabled workers obtaining
the same utility level, implies differential social security treatment of disabled workers, with different
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(p1, p2) (0.6, 0.4) (0.7, 0.3)
Types D1 H1 D2 H2 D1 H1 D2 H2
c 48.012 76.679 45.542 75.373 49.276 77.476 44.149 74.755
z 0.363 0.869 0.332 0.884 0.370 0.860 0.305 0.891802
T ′ 0.129 0 0.243 0 0.088 0 0.326 0
U 3.542 3.773 3.542 3.736 3.555 3.795 3.555 3.718
SW 3.64637 3.6478
(p1, p2) (0.8, 0.2) (0.9, 0.1)
Types D1 H1 D2 H2 D1 H1 D2 H2
c 50.718 78.488 42.515 74.101 52.532 79.876 40.551 73.388
z 0.373 0.849 0.262 0.900 0.371 0.835 0.185 0.908
T ′ 0.054 0 0.443 0 0.025 0 0.624 0
U 3.578 3.822 3.578 3.698 3.617 3.858 3.617 3.677
SW 3.65061 3.65589
Table 4: Tagging with horizontal equity among disabled workers
combinations of lifetime consumption and retirement age. Somewhat surprisingly, in the numerical
results reported horizontal equity at the bottom is achieved by inducing individuals in the harsh
occupation to retire later but compensating them with more consumption than disabled workers in
the safe occupation. The differences are more pronounced as the distribution of disabled workers
across occupations becomes more unequal. Those allocations are achieved by imposing relatively
large distortions on the disabled workers in the safe occupation and relatively small distortions on
the disabled workers in the harsh occupation. The large distortions at the bottom imposed on
the disabled workers in the safe occupation serve the purpose to relax the self-selection constraint
on the relatively numerous healthy workers in the safe occupation. The healthy workers in the
safe occupation retire later and consume less than the healthy workers in the harsh occupation
with UH1 > UH2. Healthy workers in the harsh occupation benefit from being mixed with a large
proportion of disable ones.
We have shown previously that each policy - disability tests and tagging - in isolation increases
social welfare, although whether one outperforms the other depends notably on the relative cost
of the audit technology and how different the distributions of healthy and disabled workers is
across occupations. The social planner could consider combining them. We present in Table 5 the
numerical results of combining disability tests and tagging for an intermediate audit technology
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(p1, p2) (0.6, 0.4) (0.7, 0.3)
pii 0.0196985 0.0293188 0.014906 0.0341948
Types D1 H1 D2 H2 D1 H1 D2 H2
c 51.759 77.080 46.585 72.191 54.788 80.023 44.434 70.198
z 0.340 0.865 0.350 0.923 0.333 0.833 0.351 0.950
T ′ 0.119 0 0.186 0 0.0874 0 0.219 0
U 3.657 3.784 3.536 3.640 3.726 3.862 3.485 3.575
SW 3.6529 3.65737
(p1, p2) (0.8, 0.2) (0.9, 0.1)
pii 0.0100731 0.0391329 0.0051366 0.0441375
Types D1 H1 D2 H2 D1 H1 D2 H2
c 58.126 83.361 42.579 68.480 61.795 87.150 41.029 67.026
z 0.325 0.780 0.351 0.974 0.315 0.765 0.349 0.995
T ′ 0.0569 0 0.253 0 0.028 0 0.284 0
U 3.799 3.944 3.443 3.516 3.876 4.029 3.410 3.463
SW 3.66469 3.67467
Table 5: Differential social security and audit policies
k (pi) = 1000pi2.12
The combination of testing and tagging implies a higher social welfare than that achieved with
either testing or tagging in isolation. When audit probabilities are allowed to differ by occupation
it is optimal to test more often in the safe occupation, and the difference between the audit proba-
bilities increases as the distribution of disabled workers across occupations differs more markedly.
Compared with the situation in which only disability tests are employed and the same audit proba-
bility applies to both occupations (Table 2), the audit probability is smaller in the harsh occupation
and larger in the safe occupation than the common audit probability.13 Compared with the situa-
tion in which tagging is the only policy available (Table 3), disabled workers in both occupations
are better off (consume more and work less), and healthy workers in both occupations are worse off
(consume less and work more) when audits are used alongside tagging. Among the disabled work-
ers those who benefit the most from the introduction of audits alongside tagging are the disabled
workers in the safe occupation, even if their utility remains below that of the disabled workers in
12Note that we allow the audit probability to differ by occupation in this case, for consistency with the use of the
occupation information for tagging purposes.
13This result also holds in an intermediate case, not reported here, in which the audit probabilities are allowed to
differ by occupation, but there is a common social security policy.
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the harsh occupation when horizontal equity among disabled workers is not explicitly imposed.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the possibility of differentiating the social security policy by oc-
cupation if there is evidence that the health status of workers is affected to some extent by their
occupation. Previous contributions have illustrated that there is a trend towards early retirement
in developed countries of otherwise healthy individuals that could remain in the labour force longer.
Cremer et al. (2007) in particular explored the possibility of using disability tests. We perform nu-
merical simulations to compare disability tests and tagging by occupation. The simulations suggest
that disability tests outperform tagging if the audit technology is relatively cheap and the distribu-
tion of disabled workers across occupations is relatively similar. If the audit technology available is
more expensive and/or there is a significant proportion of disabled workers in the harsh occupation
(when compared with the proportion of disabled workers in the safe occupation) differentiating the
social security policy - which is given by a combination of benefits and retirement age - is prefer-
able. Both the healthy and disabled workers in the harsh occupation are better off in the tagging
solution, consuming more and retiring earlier than their counterparts in the safe occupation. This
horizontal inequity aspect is common to other tagging applications in the literature, particularly
in income taxation, and is often criticised.
Accordingly we have explored the implications of addressing the horizontal inequities often
linked to tagging up to some extent by ensuring that the disabled worker in the safe occupation
is not made worse off than the disabled worker in harsh occupation by tagging. It is possible
to show analytically that this constraint is binding. Hence the level of social welfare that can
be achieved with tagging is reduced. In the numerical simulations we have shown that there are
cases where disability testing may become preferable where tagging was preferable in the absence
of the additional constraint. Nevertheless, if the audit technology is sufficiently expensive and/or
the distribution of disabled workers significantly differs by occupation tagging remains preferable
despite the decrease in the level of overall social welfare. We have also shown that, even though
both types of disabled workers achieve the same level of utility, the social security policy, in terms of
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benefits and age of retirement, differs by occupation. The disabled workers in the harsh occupation
are induced to retire later but are compensated with more benefits so as to achieve the same
level of utility of their disabled counterparts in the safe occupation. This is achieved by imposing
considerably larger distortions on the disabled workers in the safe occupation. The healthy workers
in the harsh occupation continue to retire earlier and consume more than their healthy counterparts
in the safe occupation.
Our results indicate that there is a case for special pension provisions for workers in harsh
occupations when the individual’s health status is private information, disability tests are relatively
costly but there is statistical information available that suggests a significantly poorer average health
status in those occupations. We have shown however that this does not necessarily mean that those
who claim to be disabled in the harsh occupation should always be allowed to retire earlier than
those who claim to be disabled in the safe occupation. If the social planner cares about possible
horizontal inequity among disabled workers it can ensure that disabled workers achieve the same
level of utility regardless of occupation by setting differentiated policies by occupation that induce
later retirement for disabled workers in the harsh occupation but compensate them with more
benefits.
Given that both policies - disability tests and tagging - are shown to increase social welfare,
the social planner could consider combining them. If audits are used alongside tagging, and the
probability of audit is allowed to differ by occupation, it is optimal to test more often in the safe
occupation. Both disabled workers are better off when compared with the case in which tagging
is the only policy available, but those who benefit the most from incorporating differential audits
are the disabled workers in the safe occupation, even if their overall utility remains lower than that
of the disabled workers in the harsh occupation when horizontal equity among disabled workers is
not imposed.
In this paper we have taken the occupation as given, which may be a reasonable approximation
if labour markets are relatively segmented. We plan to investigate the consequences of relaxing this
assumption, by allowing the occupational choice to be endogenous, in further research.
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